
Social engineering in the office: phone, front desk and USB stick
Say social engineering and most people think of phishing email, which is where defences are strongest. What is left is older and often easier: a call from “the service desk”, an engineer at reception, a USB stick in the car park. These work because they appeal to helpfulness, and they stop with a few agreements that need not make anyone rude.
The most dangerous caller is not the one who rings accounts but the one who rings the service desk: whoever gets a password or second factor reset owns the account.
At reception and at the USB port the same rule applies as on the phone: a good story is not proof, and checking happens through a channel the other person did not choose.
A report of an odd call is worth more than a colleague who handles it politely and forgets; make reporting easy and blame-free.
Social engineering beyond email
Social engineering means getting someone to do what they otherwise would not, by playing a role rather than breaking a system: the colleague from IT, the supplier’s engineer, the new starter who left their pass at home. Email is one channel for it. How to handle that channel is in our piece on phishing and the human layer, listed under further reading below.
This article covers the rest: phone, chat, the front desk, the USB port and the QR code. They get less attention because no filter stops them. There are agreements that do, though, and they cost less than any product.
Payment requests from an impersonated director fall under this too, but they have their own defence: a payment process. We leave that out here.
The phone: the caller who says they are IT
The call comes in two directions, and the second is often forgotten.
- To an employee. “Service desk here, we can see your account being misused. I’m sending you a code, could you read it out?” That code is the second factor the caller is using to sign in at that very moment.
- To the service desk. The caller is “an employee” travelling, with a new phone and in a hurry, asking for a password reset or to re-register multi-factor authentication. If it works, they have the account and everything it can reach.
Three agreements cover both directions:
- IT never asks for a code or password. Say it often enough that everyone knows, and any caller who asks is by definition not IT.
- Call back on a known number. If in doubt, hang up and ring the service desk or the colleague on the number in the directory, not the one the caller gives.
- A reset takes more than a voice. Write down how the service desk verifies someone before a password or second factor is reset: a call back to the registered number, confirmation from the line manager, or coming in with ID. The more an account can do, the stricter the check. More on that in our piece on identity and access management.
The front desk: the visitor with a good story
The engineer who “just needs the server cupboard”, the courier who wants to hand the parcel over in person, the man who follows a colleague through the door because his hands are full. Nobody wants to be rude, and the story counts on it.
- Announced engineers only. A supplier’s engineer arrives with an appointment and a ticket number reception can check with the department expecting them. No appointment, and they wait outside while someone rings.
- Escorted to technical rooms. The server room and comms cabinets are locked and a visitor does not go there alone, even if they have been before.
- Tailgating is not politeness. Anyone who comes in behind someone else without a pass is sent to reception. Agree that this is normal, and it stops being a confrontation.
- Network ports in meeting rooms. A visitor plugging a laptop into a spare wall socket should land on the guest network, not the company network.
- Locked screens. An unattended desk with an open session is a visitor’s quickest way in.
The USB stick in the car park
A found stick labelled “Salaries”, a freebie at a trade show, a charging cable left on a desk. Plugging it in to see whose it is does exactly what was intended. Some sticks and cables also behave as a keyboard and type commands as soon as they are connected; no virus scan helps against that.
- Found means handed in. An unknown stick goes to IT unopened, and IT does not simply plug it into a workstation either.
- Restrict USB storage technically. On managed devices you can block unknown USB storage and allow only encrypted, issued sticks. That takes the decision away from the employee.
- Own cables. Charge phones with your own or issued cables, not whatever happens to be lying around.
QR codes and chat messages: same trick, different channel
A QR code on a letter, a poster in the canteen or a sticker on a parking meter leads to a sign-in page that looks familiar. Because it is scanned with a phone, it sits outside the email filters and often outside device management too. The rule is simple: never sign in to a work account via a QR code; go to the known app or address.
In Teams and other chat tools the same happens with a message from an external account called “IT Support” asking someone to start a remote support tool. Two measures help: limit which external organisations staff can chat with, and show clearly when a message comes from outside. And agree that remote support only starts from a ticket the employee raised themselves.
One rule for every form, and blame-free reporting
Every form above shares one weakness: the attacker picks the channel and the story. So the defence is always the same. Verify through a channel you choose: the number in the directory, the department the visitor says is expecting them, the ticketing system. A caller or visitor with an honest request will wait calmly; urgency and secrecy are the signal to stop.
Just as important is that an odd call or visitor gets reported, even if nothing happened. Attackers rarely try just one person. Three reports of the same “service desk” in one morning tell the real service desk who needs warning. Keep reporting short (one button, one number) and blame-free: someone who read out a code and reports it straight away has made the damage smaller. The NCSC publishes guidance on this for UK organisations.
Where our work stops
What we do. We agree with you how the service desk verifies someone before a password or second factor is reset, and work that way ourselves when we are your service desk. We set things up so USB storage on devices is restricted, visitors land on a guest network, external chats are recognisable and remote support only starts from a ticket.
What we don’t do. We are not a security company: staffing reception, issuing passes and arranging guarding belong with your facilities team or security provider, and we do not sit in the alarm receiving centre. Nor do we assess employees; what happens when someone does not follow a procedure is a matter for the organisation itself.
Questions we get about this
About the forms that do not arrive by email.
What is social engineering?
Social engineering means getting someone to do what they otherwise would not, by playing a role rather than breaking into a system. Common forms are phishing email, a call from a fake service desk, a visitor with a convincing story and a USB stick left lying around.
What are examples of social engineering beyond email?
A caller claiming to be IT who asks for a code, someone ringing the service desk to get a colleague’s password reset, an engineer at reception without an appointment, someone following a colleague through the door, a found USB stick and a QR code leading to a fake sign-in page.
How does a service desk check that a caller really is an employee?
By not relying on what the caller says but on a channel the service desk chooses: calling back the registered number, confirmation from the line manager or coming in with ID. The more an account can do, the stricter the check should be, especially when re-registering multi-factor authentication.
What should you do with a USB stick you find?
Don’t plug it in, not even to see whose it is. Hand it to IT unopened. On managed devices you can block unknown USB storage technically, so employees do not have to make that call themselves.
Do you also secure the reception or the building?
No. We handle the IT side: how the service desk verifies callers, the guest network, restricting USB storage and making external chats recognisable. Reception, access passes and guarding belong with your facilities team or security provider, and we do not sit in the alarm receiving centre.
Further reading
Email, the building and reporting.
Shall we check what your service desk does on a reset?
Tell us how a password or second factor is reset today and who may ask for it. We will show where a caller with a good story gets through, and which agreement closes that gap.
Practical IT knowledge in your inbox
New guides on management, security and the workplace, written by the people doing the work. No sales talk, and you can unsubscribe in one click.