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Post-quantum cryptography: start by knowing what you encrypt

Nobody knows when a quantum computer will break today’s encryption, and for most organisations that is not the question anyway. The question is where asymmetric cryptography sits in your IT, who can replace it and how long your data needs to stay secret. Post-quantum cryptography therefore starts not with mathematics but with a list.

6 min read Written by the ITproposal team
Short answer

A quantum computer mainly threatens asymmetric cryptography: key exchange and digital signatures. Symmetric encryption such as AES-256 remains usable.

It matters now because encrypted data can be stored today and decrypted later, and because migration takes years.

The first step is an inventory of certificates, VPNs, keys and devices, noting who can replace each one. The second is asking with every new purchase whether the product can move with you.

Why this is already on the agenda

Almost every secure connection uses two kinds of cryptography. Asymmetric (RSA, elliptic curves) to exchange keys and sign things, and symmetric (such as AES) to encrypt the data itself. A large enough quantum computer could break the first kind. The second remains usable with long keys.

Nobody knows when such a machine will exist. It still matters now, for two reasons:

  • Harvest now, decrypt later. Anyone who captures and stores encrypted traffic today can open it later. For data that must stay confidential for ten years or more (medical records, contracts, designs, HR files) the risk has already started.
  • Migration takes years. Cryptography sits in firewalls, VPNs, certificates, phones, printers and equipment you buy today and will still use in ten years.

What is already settled

This is no longer speculative. NIST published the first three standards in August 2024: ML-KEM for key exchange (FIPS 203) and ML-DSA and SLH-DSA for digital signatures (FIPS 204 and 205).

In the UK, the NCSC has set out migration timelines: organisations should complete discovery and planning by 2028, migrate their highest-priority systems by 2031 and finish by 2035. The EU’s coordinated roadmap from 2025 runs on similar dates, with the most critical uses moved by 2030.

And part of it is happening already: recent versions of the major browsers and many web services now combine classical key exchange with ML-KEM when setting up a TLS connection. That is called hybrid: if one of the two turns out to be weak, the other still holds.

Post-quantum cryptography starts with an inventory

You cannot replace what you do not know you have. Go through these places and for each item record the algorithm, key length, expiry date, owner and whether it can be updated:

  • Certificates: websites, web shop, customer portal, internal servers, and your internal certificate authority if you run one.
  • VPNs: site-to-site links and remote access. This is often where the most sensitive data crosses the internet.
  • Admin keys: SSH keys, API keys and the keys your backups are encrypted with.
  • Email and documents: encrypted email, digitally signed documents, signed software.
  • Wi-Fi and network access using certificates (802.1X).
  • Hardware: HSMs, smartcards, tokens, and devices with fixed firmware such as printers, cameras and production machinery.

The hardest column is the last one: who can replace it? For most items that is not your own IT but a manufacturer or software supplier. The inventory therefore turns into a list of questions for suppliers.

What comes first: how long must it stay secret?

Not everything is equally urgent. Two questions set the order:

  • How long must the data stay confidential? A website login session from today is worthless in an hour. A VPN carrying case files between two offices every day carries data that will still be sensitive in ten years. That one goes first.
  • How long will the system be in use? A firewall, HSM or machine bought now and used for ten years must be able to take new algorithms. A laptop replaced in four years will get them through operating system updates.

The rule of thumb from the literature: add how long the data must stay secret to how long the migration will take. If that sum goes beyond the point at which a quantum computer becomes realistic, you are already late for that part. You do not know that point, so plan against the regulators’ dates.

What to ask your suppliers

Most organisations will not replace an algorithm themselves. They buy it in, which makes procurement the most important tool. With every new firewall, VPN, HSM, telephony platform or business-critical application, ask:

  • Which post-quantum algorithms does the product support today, and which are on the roadmap, with a timeframe?
  • Can it be changed through a firmware or software update, or does it need new hardware?
  • Does it support a hybrid mode, so classical and new algorithms can run side by side?
  • How long will it receive updates? A device without updates after the transition is a device you will replace then.

Record the answers against the device in your inventory. In a tender or a contract renewal they are worth having, even if the word quantum appears nowhere else.

The real goal: being able to switch

The most useful thing you can achieve now is not a quantum-safe environment but one in which you can switch algorithms quickly. That is called crypto agility, and it pays off without any quantum computer: a broken algorithm or a compromised certificate authority can then be replaced in weeks rather than years.

  • Automate certificates. Following decisions by the CA/Browser Forum, the maximum validity of public TLS certificates is coming down in steps. Anyone still renewing by hand will have to automate anyway, and an automated estate also changes algorithm more easily.
  • Keep the inventory current, as part of the asset register rather than a one-off project.
  • No hard-coded algorithms in your own software or scripts; take them from configuration.

How to manage the keys themselves, who can reach them and how to rotate them is covered in our article on key management and encryption.

Where our work stops

What we do. We build the inventory of certificates, VPNs, keys and devices in the environment we manage, automate certificate renewal, switch on hybrid and new algorithms as soon as the supplier supports them, and raise the questions above when we supply new hardware. We are ISO/IEC 27001 certified.

What we do not do. We are not cryptographers: we do not develop or assess algorithms and we do not predict when a quantum computer will arrive. We do not certify anything as quantum-safe. Whether a product supports post-quantum algorithms is up to the manufacturer; we check and carry out the update, but we cannot add it to a product that lacks it.

Frequently asked

Questions we get about this

The five that come up most often.

What is post-quantum cryptography?

Post-quantum cryptography is encryption designed to withstand attacks from a future quantum computer. It mainly means new algorithms for key exchange and digital signatures, such as ML-KEM and ML-DSA, standardised by NIST in 2024. They run on ordinary computers and are gradually replacing RSA and elliptic curves.

When will quantum computers break encryption?

Nobody knows, and estimates vary widely. That is why governments work to a plan rather than a prediction: the UK NCSC expects migration of the highest-priority systems by 2031 and completion by 2035. For data that must stay secret for a long time, it also matters that it can be captured today and decrypted later.

Does a small business need to act on post-quantum cryptography now?

Yes, but not by replacing everything. Start with an inventory of where asymmetric cryptography sits and who can replace it, and ask with every new purchase whether the product can take new algorithms. Automate certificate renewal as well; you will need that regardless.

Is AES still safe against quantum computers?

Symmetric encryption such as AES is far less threatened by a quantum computer than RSA or elliptic curves. With long keys, such as AES-256, it is considered sufficient. The problem lies in the key exchange and signatures around it.

Can you make our IT quantum-safe?

We can build the inventory, automate certificates and switch on new algorithms in the systems we manage once the supplier supports them. We do not certify anything as quantum-safe and we do not develop cryptography. Whether a product can make the move is up to its manufacturer.

Related services

Further reading

What this inventory connects to.

Shall we build your cryptographic inventory?

We go through your certificates, VPNs, keys and devices and note for each one who can replace it and what to ask the supplier.

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