Request a quote
Emergency SectorsCareers About us Blog Get in touch
Close-up of two monitors showing log lines and coloured terminal output

Privileged access management: who holds admin rights, and why?

Privileged access management starts with a question most organisations cannot answer straight away: who can install software, switch off security, create accounts and delete backups? For an SME the first step is rarely buying a PAM product. It is finding out who holds those rights today and whether they still need them. This is the order in which we do that.

6 min read Written by the ITproposal team
Short answer

Privileged access management begins with a count: who has admin rights, on which system, and who ever decided they should.

Local admin rights on laptops can almost always be cut down to a short list of exceptions, each with an owner and an end date.

A PAM tool earns its place once there are many admins, outside parties or external requirements. Who gets which rights stays your organisation’s decision.

Why an attacker goes looking for admin rights first

An ordinary account lets an attacker do limited damage: he reads what that user could read. With an admin account he disables security tools, creates his own accounts, moves to other systems and deletes the backups before encrypting anything. That is why nearly every serious attack runs through privileged access rather than the account it started on.

It also makes admin rights the cheapest place to take risk away. Every over-privileged account you remove is one route fewer, and you do not need to buy anything to do it. You need to know what is there.

The wider picture of identity and access, from MFA to roles, is on our page about access management: IAM, PAM and MFA. This article covers the narrowest and sharpest part of it.

The count: who holds admin rights today?

Make one list, even if it is untidy. Look in five places; each one turns up something nobody expected:

  • Local administrators on laptops. Who is in the Administrators group on their own device. Your management tool can report it per device; count people, not machines.
  • Admin roles in the cloud. Who holds a role such as Global Administrator in Microsoft 365 or Entra ID, and who is an admin in other SaaS tools. In many organisations that is more people than work in IT.
  • Domain and server admins. Including old accounts of people who have left.
  • Shared accounts on equipment. The single admin password for the firewall, the NAS, the switches and the printers, and who knows it.
  • Service accounts and suppliers. Accounts software runs under, and the accounts outside parties log in with.

Against each line ask two questions: what is this needed for, and who decided it. A line with no answer to the second question is your first candidate for removal.

Removing local admin rights without stopping work

Staff usually have local admin rights for a practical reason: a printer driver, a tool they had to install themselves, an old application that will not start otherwise. Take the rights away without solving that and the service desk is flooded the next morning, and the rights are back within a month.

  • A software portal. What people used to install themselves, they pick from an approved catalogue without admin rights.
  • Elevation per application. The one program that needs admin rights gets them; the user does not.
  • An exceptions list. Those who genuinely need it (developers, a specialist) are on it with a reason, an owner and an end date. An exception without an end date is a new default.
  • A unique local admin password per device. Windows LAPS gives every machine its own rotating password for the local admin account, so one leaked password no longer opens every laptop at once.

Start with a small group you know well, watch for a week what breaks, then roll out. It is faster than doing it all at once and it gives you the real exceptions.

Separate admin accounts, and rights only when needed

Whoever administers systems does not do it from the account they use for email and browsing. A phishing email or a compromised website then lands on an ordinary account, not on the keys to the whole environment. That is the most important rule in this article and it costs nothing.

  • A separate account per admin, named, never shared, protected with phishing-resistant MFA such as a security key or passkey.
  • Just-in-time rights. Instead of being a permanent Global Administrator, someone requests the role for a task and loses it after a few hours. Microsoft offers this in Entra ID with a higher licence tier; with only a handful of admins a strict agreed procedure can be enough.
  • Two break-glass accounts for when MFA or the identity service itself fails. Excluded from the normal rules, with long passwords stored offline and apart, and an alert whenever someone signs in with one.

Suppliers and service accounts: the access nobody sees

Outside parties often hold more rights than your own staff, with less oversight. The vendor of your line-of-business software logging in remotely through their own tool, with an account that has had the same password for years, is an open door that appears on no rota.

  • One way in for every external admin, named and with MFA, rather than each supplier using their own remote tool.
  • Time-boxed access. On for the job, off afterwards. Someone who visits once a month does not need standing access.
  • Service accounts with an owner. Only the rights the software actually uses, no interactive sign-in, and the password in a vault rather than a spreadsheet.
  • Logs you keep. Who signed in with which account and when. It is the first question in any incident, and without logs there is no answer.

When you need a privileged access management tool, and when not yet

A privileged access management tool keeps admin passwords in a vault, issues them temporarily, records admin sessions and logs what happened. That is valuable, but it is the last step, not the first. If you do not yet know who holds admin rights, a tool mostly puts the mess in a vault.

Signs that it is time:

  • Many admins or many outside parties, so agreements alone no longer keep the overview.
  • An external requirement. An insurer, a large customer or an audit asking for recorded admin sessions or provably temporary rights. Under NIS2, access control and the management of privileged accounts are among the measures an organisation must be able to show. The UK NCSC’s guidance on privileged access points in the same direction.
  • Systems you cannot otherwise protect, such as old equipment with one shared admin password.

What a tool costs depends on the number of admins and systems and whether you need session recording. So ask a vendor what the product does for your list, not for its full feature sheet.

Where our work stops

What we do. We build the list of admin rights across laptops, servers, cloud and equipment, remove local admin rights with a working alternative, set up separate admin accounts, break-glass accounts and a single route for suppliers, and supply and manage a PAM tool when one turns out to be needed.

What we do not do. We do not decide who in your organisation gets which rights; that decision belongs to management or the process owner, and we record and carry it out. We are not an auditor: we do not state that you meet NIS2, a standard or the terms of your cyber insurance. That judgement belongs to the auditor and the insurer.

Frequently asked

Questions we get about this

The five that come up most often.

What is privileged access management?

Privileged access management (PAM) is the control of accounts with elevated rights: admins, service accounts and outside parties. The aim is that as few people as possible hold those rights, only when needed, with a record of who did what. A PAM tool helps, but it only works once you know who holds rights today.

What is the difference between IAM and PAM?

IAM governs who can reach which systems, for all users. PAM is the part of it that deals with accounts holding admin rights. Those get stricter rules, because one misused admin account does more damage than a hundred ordinary ones.

Should staff have local admin rights on their laptops?

Usually not. The reason is almost always practical, such as installing software or adding a printer, and there are alternatives: a software portal and elevation per application. Anyone who genuinely needs it gets an exception with a reason and an end date.

What is a break glass account?

An emergency admin account for when normal sign-in fails, for example during an MFA outage. Keep two, excluded from the usual rules, with long passwords stored offline, and raise an alert whenever someone signs in with one.

Can you confirm we meet NIS2 or our insurer’s requirements?

No. We are not an auditor and we do not state that an organisation meets NIS2, a standard or an insurer’s terms. We put the measures in place and document what was done, so you can show it to whoever does give that judgement.

Do you know who holds admin rights in your organisation?

We build the list across laptops, cloud, servers and equipment, and tell you which rights you can safely take back. Who gets what is then your call.

Practical IT knowledge in your inbox

New guides on management, security and the workplace, written by the people doing the work. No sales talk, and you can unsubscribe in one click.

We use your address for the newsletter only. See our privacy policy.

Request a quote Call